Imagining National Security: The CIA, Hollywood, and the War on Terror by Kumar, Deepa & Kundnani, Arun
Democratic Communiqué 
Volume 26 Issue 2 Article 5 
12-23-2014 




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique 
Recommended Citation 
Kumar, Deepa and Kundnani, Arun (2014) "Imagining National Security: The CIA, Hollywood, and the War 
on Terror," Democratic Communiqué: Vol. 26 : Iss. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol26/iss2/5 
This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Democratic Communiqué by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For 
more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
Imagining National Security: The CIA,        
Hollywood, and the War on Terror  
 
Deepa Kumar and Arun Kundnani  
 
Abstract: The era of the War on Terror has necessitated a security imagination 
that both justifies a gigantic national security state and provides security personnel 
with the scenarios needed to develop security practices and policies. While schol-
ars have studied the ways in which cultural products are influenced by national 
security agencies, we seek to highlight the complementarity in the media-state nex-
us and the part played by the culture industry in furnishing the security establish-
ment with the cultural imagination needed to meet its goals. Such a dialectical ap-
proach has the advantage of charting the flow of culture in multiple directions in 
order to develop a holistic understanding of how a national security imagination is 
mobilized. In particular, we focus on the show Homeland to explore the ways in 
which the workings of the national-security state under Obama have been natural-
ized through the activities of a new and rebranded CIA. We set out to contribute to 
the relatively small body of work on the CIA and Hollywood through this prelimi-
nary analysis of Homeland.  
 




n September 2013, the US television show Homeland began its third season with rec-
ord-breaking ratings.1 The show’s creators Alex Ganza and Howard Gordon, who pre-
viously collaborated on the popular series 24,2 seem to have worked out a successful 
narrative for the War on Terror during the Obama era. If 24 reflected the Bush admin-
istration’s cowboy, shoot-em-up (and torture them) style, Homeland is about Obama’s 
“smarter” war.3 Not surprisingly, President Obama loves Homeland, listing it as one of two 
“must-see” shows.4 New York Times TV critic Alessandra Stanley commented: “ Homeland 
is 24 for grown-ups.”5 Dick Cheney also seems to watch the show, stating that he could re-
late to a plot in Season 2, in which the vice-president is killed by terrorist-hackers who take 
control of his defibrillator. In 2007, Cheney had asked his doctor to disconnect the wireless 
system in his new defibrillator as a precaution against such threats, anticipating Homeland’s 
storyline by some years.6 
The imaginary worlds created by Hollywood’s film and television offerings shape, and 
are shaped by, security personnel and the various agencies of the national security state. 
While scholars have studied the ways in which cultural products are influenced by national 
security agencies, we seek to highlight the complementarity in the media-state nexus and the 
part played by the culture industry in furnishing the security establishment with the cultural 
imagination needed to meet its goals. Such a dialectical approach has the advantage of 
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charting the flow of culture in multiple directions in order to develop a holistic understand-
ing of how a national security imagination is mobilized. In particular, we focus on the show 
Homeland to explore the ways in which the workings of the national-security state under 
Obama have been naturalized through the activities of a new and rebranded CIA. We set out 
to contribute to the relatively small body of work on the CIA and Hollywood through this 
preliminary analysis of Homeland. We use the term “Hollywood” symbolically to refer to 
television and film production even though increasingly these cultural texts are being pro-
duced in locations around the US and the world.7 
 
 
The media-state nexus 
 
Government agencies have a long history of influencing cultural representations and deter-
mining how the public understands the work of the national-security state. All the way back 
in the 1930s, the FBI set up an office to shape and police its image in film, radio, and televi-
sion shows. FBI press officers have sought since then to mystify the workings of the Bureau 
by encouraging fictional depictions that glorify its activities.8 Other government agencies – 
the Department of Defense, the army, the navy, air force – followed the FBI’s lead soon af-
terwards, and established media offices aimed at systematically winning media producers’ 
sympathetic portrayals. The CIA and the Department of Homeland Security have most re-
cently joined the trend.9 
Troublingly, what used to be ad hoc relationships between the US military and Holly-
wood has now become systematized. Nick Turse (2008) points out that the military has set 
up a “one-stop shop” where, on one floor of a Los Angeles building, the army, air force, 
navy, marines, coast guard, and Department of Defense all have liaison offices.10 The army, 
navy and air force joined together to sponsor the GI Film Festival where Hollywood execu-
tives and film-makers hobnob with top military brass.11 Turse further argues that the logic of 
militarism has become so expansive and ubiquitous that the system is now more appropri-
ately described as the “military-industrial-technological-entertainment- academic-scientific-
media-intelligence-homeland security-surveillance-national security-corporate complex,” 
which he refers to as the “complex.” The most striking aspect of this new complex, he notes, 
is the “effort to project a cool, hip image, including military-crafted simulators that have 
become commercial video games; NASCAR events that feature race cars sponsored by 
branches of the armed forces; slick recruiting campaigns that use the hottest social network-
ing technology to capture the attention of teens.”12 
For the corporate media, such partnering with the security establishment is driven by fi-
nancial incentives.  In exchange for handing over some editorial control, they are able to 
shoot on location, use government personnel as extras, avail of stock footage, use expensive 
equipment, and have access to technical consultants – without the costs appearing in the 
production budget. For the for-profit media industry, it is cheaper to go along with govern-
ment influence than to hire its own submarines and air force carriers. For instance, Robb 
(2004) shows that in the film Golden Eye an American admiral was to be seduced and killed 
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by a female Russian crime syndicate operative, but to receive military support they had to 
change the nationality of the Admiral to Canadian.13 In order to get the CIA’s assistance for 
the television show Covert Affairs, the producers shared the script with the Agency to 
demonstrate that they would depict them in a positive light.14  Since then, the creators have 
routinely contacted the CIA in order to gather research and information to shape “the writ-
ing, the lingo, and the set design” of the show.15 The upshot is a system where film and tele-
vision become arteries through which the national-security state circulates its latest obses-
sions.  
In his analysis of the depiction of Arabs in Hollywood, Jack Shaheen (2003) noted a pat-
tern of Arab-bashing films like True Lies, Executive Decision, and Freedom Strike receiving 
equipment, personnel, and technical assistance from the Department of Defense in the 
1990s. In 2000, the Pentagon even spent $295,000 to host a star-studded dinner in honor of 
Motion Picture Association President Jack Valenti. Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon 
commented at the time, “If we can have television shows and movies that show the excite-
ment and importance of military life, they can help generate a favorable atmosphere for re-
cruiting.”16 The effort has paid off with the creation of a slew of films and television shows 
that whitewash the military and national security agencies, including recent films like Rules 
of Engagement and Argo, and the shows JAG and Covert Affairs. The 2013 film Lone Survi-
vor, written and directed by Peter Berg, involved Berg “embedding”  with a navy SEAL 
team for a month in Iraq in the process of developing the screenplay. The US air force made 
available a base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, for filming, along with helicopters, vehicles, 
and personnel. “Some days on set, the actual military personnel outnumbered the cast and 
crew,” states the production notes for the film.17 
The CIA, although late to this game, is now an integral part of it; it set up its Entertain-
ment Liaison office in 1996. However, the CIA has had an informal relationship with Holly-
wood that goes much further back. John Rizzo, who served as the Acting General Counsel 
of the CIA for the first nine years of the War on Terror (and therefore was closely involved 
in the agency’s torture, extraordinary rendition, and drone strike programs), writes frankly 
in his recent book, Company Man, on the relationship with Hollywood. As a person who 
worked for the CIA for well over three decades, he writes that: 
 
… the CIA has long had a special relationship with the entertainment indus-
try, devoting considerable attention to fostering relationships with Holly-
wood movers and shakers – studio executives, producers, directors, and big-
name actors. There are officers assigned to this account full-time, which is 
not exactly a dangerous assignment but one that occasionally produces its 
own bizarre moments. 
 
In my early years at the Agency [the 1970s], a veteran CIA liaison with 
Hollywood first explained it to me this way: These are people who have 
made a lot of money basically creating make-believe stuff. A lot of them, at 
least the smarter and more self-aware ones, realize what they do makes 
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them ridiculously rich but is also ephemeral and meaningless in the larger 
scheme of things. So they’re receptive to helping the CIA in any way they 
can, probably in equal parts because they are sincerely patriotic and because 
it gives them a taste of real-life intrigue and excitement. And their power 
and international celebrity can be valuable – it gives them entree to people 
and places abroad. Heads of state want to meet and get cozy with them. … 
 
Their film crews are given free rein everywhere, even in places where the 
US government doesn’t normally have it. And they can be the voice of a US 
message that will have impact with foreign audiences so long as the audi-
ence doesn’t know it is coming from the US government.18 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and more recently the events of 9/11, the Agency has 
consciously sought to rebrand itself so as to counter past negative portrayals and justify its 
changing role in the US security landscape. Tricia Jenkins (2012) argues that the CIA has 
historically been presented by Hollywood as an agency of rogues who operate unchecked, as 
killers who are bent on assassination, as people who lack morality or operate on morally 
ambiguous grounds, and as an organization that is disorganized and buffoonish. When the 
clandestine organization opened its doors to Hollywood (quite literally in the form of allow-
ing films and TV shows to be shot at the CIA headquarters) it was met with enthusiasm by 
Hollywood. The attacks of 9/11 created an obsession with the Agency among film directors, 
so much so that CIA officials have been in high demand since then.19 This convergence has 
resulted in a series of television dramas like The Agency (2001-2003), JAG (1995-2005), 
Alias (2001-2006), 24 (2001-present) and Homeland (2011-present) as well as various films 
like Bad Company (2002,) The Recruit (2003), and Zero Dark Thirty (2012), where the CIA 
has exerted its influence and rebranded itself. 
During his recent visit to the CIA offices, Homeland co-creator Alex Ganza asked for 
suggestions for locations of future story lines. The agency pointed him in the direction of 
North Africa, which happens to be the most recent focus of US counter-terrorism efforts.20 
National security journalist Kevin Gosztola has written of declassified memos that point to 
the CIA’s involvement in the production of Zero Dark Thirty. The CIA acknowledged the 
film was a fictionalized version of the killing of Osama bin Laden but noted that it would 
“help promote an appropriate portrayal of the Agency and the Bin Laden operation.” The 
Agency was able to persuade the film-makers to re-edit two scenes in order to cast CIA of-
ficers in a more favorable light.21 When they haven’t been able to control the script, the CIA 
has refused to offer assistance such as with the films Spy Game (2001) and The Bourne 
Identity (2002).22 It has also sought to use cultural texts as a means to intimidate its enemies 
by showcasing futuristic devises and portraying the agency as “more omnipresent and om-
nipotent” than it is in reality.23 
But this has not just been a one-way relationship, in which the security establishment has 
determined cultural production. There is also a reverse impact, in that Hollywood has 
shaped the imagination of politicians and policy makers. In Five Came Back, Mark Harris 
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(2014) outlines the work of five film directors who worked closely with the US military to 
churn out war propaganda during World War Two. He notes, however, that their films did-
n’t simply furnish war propaganda in a unidirectional manner; rather the directors’ creative 
work also influenced how policy makers viewed the war. We see a similar dynamic in the 
War on Terror era.  
In 2003, President George W. Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” moment featured Bush 
landing a jet fighter onto an aircraft carrier in order to deliver a speech about the supposed 
triumph in Iraq. This dramatic moment, which cost over a million dollars, was nearly identi-
cal to visual sequences in the Tom Cruise’s 1986 film Top Gun.24 Robin Anderson notes 
that there was no justification for the use of a jet fighter since a helicopter could more easily 
have delivered the president; rather, the entire pseudo-event was meant to endow Bush with 
the “cool” masculine, militarist image of Cruise’s character, Maverick. This shouldn’t sur-
prise us, since the “complex,” as Turse notes, works seamlessly to integrate militarism into 
everyday life from video games to social media, NASCAR races, and golf courses.  
The 9/11 Commission report, released in 2004, famously identified a “failure of imagina-
tion” as the basic problem with US national security policy. “Imagination is not a gift usual-
ly associated with bureaucracies,” noted the report’s authors. Preventing terrorist attacks in 
the future would require finding “a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of 
imagination.”25 It was noted at the time that Tom Clancy’s 1994 novel Debt of Honor had 
already imagined an airline pilot flying a Boeing 747 into the US Capitol during a joint ses-
sion of Congress, yet intelligence agencies themselves had not anticipated this possibility. In 
the War on Terror, it seemed, the erstwhile inability of security bureaucracies to imagine 
potential threat scenarios might be remedied by drawing on the creativity of Hollywood 
scriptwriters and right-wing pulp novelists. What was needed, it was thought, was to get 
inventive in conjuring up potential threats, as well as breaking down pre-existing assump-
tions of how best to prevent them. Hollywood was elevated in its role and became as signifi-
cant as Arlington, Fort Meade, and Langley in the landscape of the US national-security 
state. 
One early documented case of this reverse impact occurred with the Fox TV series 24. In 
effect, the show provided a weekly policy briefing to the nation on the myriad threats sup-
posedly faced by the US and how best to counter them. Joel Surnow, the show’s co-creator 
and executive producer, told journalist Jane Mayer, “America wants the war on terror fought 
by Jack Bauer. He’s a patriot.”26 Since Bauer’s main tactic in the show is torture, the impli-
cation was clear. In the fall of 2002, government lawyers responsible for authorizing new 
techniques of interrogation felt that the second season of 24, then being broadcast, gave 
them the green light to approve torture techniques that had previously been considered unac-
ceptable.27 As Kumar (2013) has argued, the singular achievement of 24 was that, whereas 
earlier cultural representations of torture were associated with the “bad guys,” this show 
established why “we,” and why heroes, needed to use such methods.28 The limits of accepta-
bility had been collectively re-imagined, creating a new “common sense” of national securi-
ty. The fact that a 2012 film like Zero Dark Thirty presents the use of torture as an accepta-
ble topic of discussion rather than an absolute wrong is a good indication of how much the 
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terror war has permanently shifted earlier ethical norms in the name of a Hollywood-infused 
“moral clarity” against terrorism. The television series Scandal furthers the normalization of 
torture, this time against security personnel and co-workers, through the actions of its B6-13 
agents. The ultra-secret B6-13 may be read as an avatar of the CIA which, in violation of its 
jurisdiction, has started to operate in the domestic US context. Potentially, it could also rep-
resent the National Security Agency (NSA). 
When politicians and government lawyers invoke Hollywood productions as a way to 
measure what the public considers ethically acceptable, they tend to forget that these pro-
ductions’ security narratives are themselves shaped by the national-security state. As a de-
finer of ethical limits in national security policy, Hollywood is hopelessly compromised but, 
time and again, it provides the reference points with which political leaders frame their poli-
cy decisions. When then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton was asked by CNN journalist Pe-
ter Bergen about the bin Laden raid, she replied: “This was like any episode of 24 or any 
movie you could ever imagine.”29 The implication was that Hollywood had already settled 
any lingering ethical doubts.  
While 24 embodied the ethos of the early War on Terror, in more recent years a different 
narrative has emerged. The failure of the war in Iraq, the declining credibility of the United 
States on the global stage, and the backlash against George W. Bush’s approach necessitated 
a shift. Enter Obama and the age of “smart power.” The US national-security state now 
claims to be interested in winning “hearts and minds” as much as “shock and awe.” Cultural 
knowledge, targeted strikes, and patient intelligence-gathering are supposed to be the new 
methods of the War on Terror, rather than blanket demonization, military occupations, and 
fabricated casus belli.30 
 
 
Homeland and liberal imperialism 
 
A marked departure from 24’s ticking time-bomb scenarios, Showtime’s Homeland features 
storylines that center upon the psychological turmoil leading to what homeland security offi-
cials call “radicalization,” particularly when it involves Americans converting to Islam. In 
the early War on Terror, the prevailing analysis of terrorism among policy-makers was that 
it was an “evil ideology” that had to be confronted directly through greater violence in the 
form of war, torture, and incarceration. But from 2004 onwards, policy-makers became in-
terested in the process by which terrorists are made and the potential for other forms of “soft 
intervention” that could complement the hard power tactics of the early years. To aid in de-
veloping such policies, academics in the field of terrorism studies (which had burgeoned 
with public funding after 9/11) developed models of “radicalization” that emphasized mo-
ments of psychological vulnerability as pivotal to the adoption of “extremist” ideology. Un-
der Obama, the concept of “radicalization” has provided the chief lens through which Mus-
lim populations are surveilled domestically and globally. The academic models of radicali-
zation – adopted by the FBI and the New York Police Department, for example – claim to 
be able to provide a list of warning signs that a Muslim is on a path towards terrorism. In the 
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official accounts of radicalization, intelligence analysts list commitment to religious beliefs, 
anger at foreign policy, and isolation from family as signs that a Muslim is radicalizing, par-
ticularly if they occur in a context of psychological turmoil.31 The CIA consultants reported-
ly involved in Homeland’s script development are likely to have drawn on such notions of 
“radicalization” and much of the plot, especially in season one, revolves around such warn-
ing signs.32 
In season one, we learn that Nick Brody, a white American marine, was captured and 
held prisoner by al-Qaeda for eight years. The narrative of the show’s opening episodes is 
driven by Brody’s hiding the fact that he has converted to Islam. Viewers are teased into 
drawing the conclusion that Brody has become a terrorist – which, eventually, turns out to 
be the case thereby confirming the specious radicalization theories. The CIA’s Carrie 
Mathison – whose character is reportedly based on the same actual CIA analyst that inspired 
the lead in Zero Dark Thirty – suspects Brody and initiates a rogue surveillance operation 
which proves her to be correct. Mathison obsessively watches Brody’s every action, even in 
the bathroom, which then leads her to develop romantic feelings for him. The plotline not 
only justifies such invasive surveillance from a counter-terrorism point of view, but also 
shows it can be the basis for love.  
To be sure, Brody and Mathison are complex characters, and the first season impressed 
audiences through its unpredictable and sophisticated narrative. Additionally, the show’s 
apparently liberal stance, and the inclusion of scenes such as the one where Brody’s daugh-
ter critiques US militarism, complicates the narrative.  When her classmate suggests that 
Iranians are the enemies of the US and that a nuclear bomb be dropped on Iran, Dana pushes 
back against this argument. She further argues that all Muslims aren’t bad people and that 
she knows this because her father is a convert. But at its core, Homeland’s key accomplish-
ment is to naturalize the workings of the national-security state in the Obama era. If 
Obama’s policy involved a shift in focus onto the “homegrown” terrorist, Brody came to 
personify what happens to good Americans when they adopt Islam. But because he is a 
white Muslim, with a traditional heteronormative all-American family life, he is not like 
Hollywood’s typical irrational, one-dimensional (brown) Jihadist. Brody’s suicide mission 
to kill the vice president is abandoned after an emotional last-minute conversation with his 
daughter. Brody then confesses to Mathison during an interrogation, and he agrees to work 
as a double agent.  
In season two, the audience is told that Israel has bombed Iran to prevent it from devel-
oping nuclear weapons; this becomes the pretext for a focus on Hezbollah, which has im-
plausibly allied with al-Qaeda in seeking to attack the US in revenge. Beirut is morphed into 
an imaginary terrorist enclave, and the season culminates in a devastating car-bombing at 
the CIA’s headquarters. Like 24 before it, the series presents a homeland that is vulnerable 
to both internal and external threats, continuing a Hollywood tradition of transforming loca-
tions like bus depots, airports, and train stations into war zones.33 One might argue that, be-
cause of its serialized nature in contrast to films, a show like Homeland serves to more ef-
fectively present a vulnerable homeland, through its exaggerated focus on domestic threats. 
Such a narrative not only fosters an elevated threat consciousness but also justifies the 
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CIA’s turn to domestic security (which is beyond its jurisdiction) and the need for agents 
like Mathison. Mathison’s obsession with connecting the dots in the hunt for Abu Nazir, the 
mastermind behind various attacks, leads her to spy on and observe wide swathes of people 
within the US. More recently, the NSA’s talking point to justify its total surveillance used a 
similar logic, that future 9/11s can only be prevented by collecting ever more “dots” of in-
formation about US citizens.34  
In the third season, the show shifts its attention to terrorist financing, with an Iranian in-
telligence officer funding terrorism against the US from Caracas, Venezuela, where Brody 
has also gone into hiding. This theme is poached from neoconservatives, who have in recent 
years fantasized that Iran might use Latin America as an “operational base to wage asym-
metric warfare against the United States,” in the words of an American Enterprise Institute 
report.35 Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez supposedly joined this new axis of pink and green evil. 
For the US far right, the phantasm of a Latin American Hezbollah is the ideal fear scenario, 
uniting the threats of terrorism, leftism, and Hispanic immigration in a single image of evil. 
Mathison’s thoughtful CIA mentor, Saul Berenson, is the true hero of Homeland and a 
character who fully embodies the contradictions and limitations of Obama’s War on Terror. 
His Indian wife, cultural knowledge of the Middle East, and fluency in Arabic are empha-
sized, much like President Obama’s own multi-cultural credentials. These traits enable him 
to pursue terrorist enemies more effectively, through the cultivation of reliable informants 
and carefully considered decision-making, rather than 24’s gung-ho missions. Berenson 
even has a detailed knowledge of Iranian soccer, information that proves useful when the 
name of a player is used as a cover identity by the owner of a Venezuelan soccer team 
thought to be involved in terrorism. (Such cultural knowledge, a tool of “soft power,” is also 
key to the pivotal moment in Argo when a Farsi-speaking US embassy official is able to 
convince Revolutionary Guards at Tehran airport to allow his group to board a Swissair 
plane and flee the country.) Yet Berenson also believes in racial profiling when necessary, 
on one occasion giving his team instructions on how to conduct an investigation: “We prior-
itize. First the dark-skinned ones.” When he is assigned an assistant, Fara, who wears a hi-
jab, Berenson tells her: “You wearing that thing on your head – it’s one big ‘fuck you’ to the 
people that would’ve been your coworkers.” Blatant racism, where all Muslims come to be 
seen as collectively responsible for the actions of Jihadists, is presented as natural and ac-
ceptable. The tone of the show is one where racial discrimination is a regrettable but under-
standable tactic that even America’s most principled security officials are likely to succumb 
to when investigating terrorist threats. 
As he assumes leadership of the CIA in season three, Berenson is depicted as so cautious 
and precise in his decision-making that he almost calls off a long-planned, coordinated se-
ries of extra-judicial killings of six terrorist suspects because one person cannot be located. 
This is exactly the picture President Obama has sought to portray of himself as a bearer of 
moral wisdom who reflects on philosophical questions as he authorizes the “kill list.”36 It is 
not surprising therefore that Obama is reported to have told actor Damian Lewis, who plays 
Brody, that he found the show believable.37 Also suggestive are the parallels between 
Homeland’s Berenson and John Brennan, the current director of the real CIA. Brennan is 
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fluent in Arabic and has said of Islam that he has “respect for a faith that has helped to shape 
my own worldview.”38 The New Y ork Times reports that he is seen as “a priest” within sen-
ior national security circles.39 But Brennan has also defended the CIA’s torture and extraor-
dinary rendition programs, and is one of the chief architects of the use of drones to carry out 
targeted killings. 
Torture is not the universal solution it was on 24, but it can still be an essential item in 
Homeland’s counterterrorism tool kit, so long as it is used in conjunction with Mathison’s 
and Berenson’s soft skills. Brody is stabbed through the hand by an interrogator, but only so 
that Mathison can step in afterward and present herself as the good cop, using empathy ra-
ther than force to win his cooperation. US policies in Homeland are essentially benign but 
occasionally undermined by rogue cliques, who lead the government astray into counterpro-
ductive excesses. The show gives Mathison and Berenson some opportunities to voice their 
concerns about such excesses from within the national security system. But the only Muslim 
voices raising political issues do so as terrorists. In line with the official radicalization narra-
tive, political dissent and terrorism are collapsed into each other: The only Muslim voice is 
the terrorist voice. 
On a deeper level, then, the assumptions underpinning Homeland’s War on Terror re-
main very much the same as 24’s, even as the show brandishes more liberal credentials. 
Howard Gordon stated that he was “disturbed” by the accusations of 24 “stoking Islamopho-
bia and being a midwife to a public acceptance of torture,” arguing that they “actively en-
gaged and reconsidered how we told stories.”40 The response to these disturbing accusations 
is a show that is more liberal and has a more subtle enunciation of the same underlying 
counter-terrorism story, but one that remains Islamophobic in its basic structure. Ultimately, 
Homeland functions in the same way as 24, providing a means for the national-security state 
to publicize fantasies of terrorist threat, while setting new norms of acceptability on issues 
ranging from surveillance to political violence that then feed back into national security pol-
icy. Through its liberal veneer it not only sells the public on the notion that the War on Ter-
ror requires a permanent state of emergency, but that educated, sober, ethical, and smart 
people are in charge, and that we should trust them to guard us. The CIA, an organization 
with few rivals in the use of political terror, is rebranded and presented as the sole agency 




Beyond the National-Security State 
 
Even while Hollywood collaborates with the national-security state, this arrangement is not 
without contradiction. Their symbiosis does not constitute a perfectly synchronous system 
devoid of incongruities. Not all cultural products have such clear links to government propa-
ganda, as culture exceeds the limits set by elite groups. Although NSA chief Keith Alexan-
der modeled his control room – dubbed the “Information Dominance Center” – on the 
bridge of the Starship Enterprise (complete with sliding doors, gleaming chrome, a central 
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command chair, and massive screens), he is unlikely to follow the lead of the most recent 
Star Trek film, Into Darkness, that eschews the War on Terror path and instead reinstates the 
mission of peaceful exploration.41 Preferring the darkness of the skies to the darkness of war, 
the film has an implicit critique of the War on Terror and the ways in which the powerful 
create threats against whom war becomes necessary. In one scene, Benedict Cumberbatch, 
who plays the villain, explains that his role as a threat serves to advance the martial agenda 
of a Star Fleet admiral; he then introduces himself by saying “My Name is Khan” in an ob-
vious reference to the Bollywood film by that name about religious and racial profiling in 
the US. Another blockbuster film from the summer of 2013 that raises a subtle critique of 
the language of the War on Terror is Iron Man 3, in which a bin Laden-type character is 
shown to be a convenient enemy created by powerful white American elites in the pursuit of 
world domination. In short, Hollywood can and does offer limited critiques of the powerful 
as it tries to cater to and tap into the anxieties of the 99 percent. 
Yet, what is largely absent is films and shows that humanize the Other. The real failure 
of imagination in the War on Terror is not the inability of security personnel to visualize 
terrorist threats; it is the inability of US mainstream popular culture to engage in the most 
elementary act of empathy – to imagine what it is like for those on the receiving end of im-
perial violence. Rapper Immortal Technique, for instance, manages what should be a basic 
commitment for any artist working on the War on Terror: to see things from the Other’s 
point of view. In his 2005 track “Bin Laden,” he raps: “They say the rebels in Iraq still fight 
for Saddam. But that’s bullshit. I’ll show you why it’s totally wrong. Cuz if another country 
invaded the hood tonight, it’d be warfare through Harlem and Washington Heights. I would-
n’t be fighting for Bush or white America’s dream. I’d be fighting for my people’s survival 
and self-esteem.” 
In October 2013, Rafiq ur Rehman, a Pakistani primary school teacher, came to Wash-
ington to testify to Congress on the killing of his 67-year-old mother in a CIA drone strike. 
The rows of empty seats that greeted him mirror the empty space in Hollywood where there 
ought by now to have been a film that truly captures the Iraqi or Afghan experience of US 
military occupation, or the Pakistani, Yemeni, or Somali experiences of living under the 
constant threat of drone violence.42 Nick Broomfield’s The Battle of Haditha (2007) offers 
one model of what such film-making might look like. Even as the national-security-
Hollywood nexus churns out War on Terror propaganda, it is susceptible to shifts in the 
popular mood. Eventually, one hopes, such pressure will lead the US culture industry to 
confront state violence directly and acknowledge that its own government, as Martin Luther 
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